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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
LYLE BOLGEH,
)
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.BETH EDWARDS and CLYDE L.
EDWARDS,
Def enda·ntl) and Respondents.

Case No. 10261

)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appealed from the Fourth Judicial District Court
The Honorable Joseph E. Nelson, Judge
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is brought on a promissory note which
Plaintiff contends has been only partially satisfied and
Defendants contend no promissory note has been executed, and further that any obligation owing was satisfied
by a return of certain merchandise from said Defendants
to said Plaintiff Appellant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
rrhe lower court held no promissory note was exeeuted and that there was a return of certain merchandise,
satisfying any obligation owing by the Defendant to the
Plaintiff, and entered its decret> dismissing the complaint
of the Plaintiff with prejudice on the 30th day of October, 1964.
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RELIEF SOUGHrr ON APPEAL
Plaintiff Appellant requests the judgment of the
lower court be reversed and that a judgment be granted
in favor of the Plaintiff Appellant in the sum of $354.28,
together with interest at the rate of eight per cent per
annum from the date of judgment until paid in full, and
costs incurred herein.
OF FACTS
For some time prior to March 5, 1960, the Plaintiff
Appellant, Mrs. Lyle Bolger, and the Defendant Respondent Beth Edwards represented Stanley Products Company for the sale of certain merchandise in the particular
locale in which they resided. While both parties were so
engaged, the Defendant Mrs. Beth Edwards purchased
from time to time certain merchandise from the Plaintiff
paying the Plaintiff upon delivery of the goods (Tr. 8).
Shortly prior to March 5, 1960, Plaintiff ceased doing
business for Stanley Products Company and had a large
supply of merchandise in stock. There is some conflict
in the testimony as to whether or not the Plaintiff requested Defendants to store the merchandise or whether
it was to be sold to the Defendants by the Plaintiff. However, on the 5th day of March, 1960, Defendants and each
of them, Beth Edwards and Clyde Edwards, drove to
the home of the Plaintiff in Salt Lake City from their
home located in Orem, Utah, and received certain merchandise which was stored in a duplex owned by the
Plaintiff. At this time they executed a document identified as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, which is purported to be a
promissory note (Tr. 9). Said notP provided for payment
S~l1ATEMENT
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of $75.00 or more per month until the total sum of $422.98
had been paid. In the amended a1rnwer of Defendants
(Page 9, Record on Appeal) the Defendant Beth Edwards admitted execution of said note, but it was contended that the document was not a promissory note,
and further that the Defendant Clyde Edwards did not
execute the same. On cross-examination the Defendant
Beth Edwards stated that the note was not a complicated
document and that slw understood it (Tr. 36). There is
no testimony given to the effect that Defendant Clyde
L. Edwards did not understand the document that he
later admitted executing (Tr. 50). The Plaintiff testified
that the consideration for said promissory note was the
merchandise admitted to have been received by the Defendants, an inventory of which was made at the time
that the merchandise was picked up, and introduced into
evidence as Defendant's Exhibits 2 and 3.
Mrs. Bolger testified that there was never any conversation made relative to the storing of said merchandise for her (Tr. 10), although the Defendants each contended to the contrary. The Plaintiff alleged in the
amended complaint (Page 7, Record on Appeal) that the
Defendants had returned certain merchandise in the
value of $43.70 in partial satisfaction of said promissory
note, and had paid in addition $25.00 in cash, which was
to apply as a credit upon said promissory note, thereby
leaving a balance due and owing to the Plaintiff from the
Defendants and each of them in the sum of $354.28. The
Def <>ndant l\Irs. Edwards testified that a receipt for
eertain merchandise which was received by the Plaintiff
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was given to the Plaintiff (Tr. 42) and further that
when anyone picked up merchandise she filled out a receipt card. The Plaintiff's testimony corresponds with
that of the Defendant in this instance (Tr. 17). The Defendant Beth Edwards testified that after March 5,
1960, the date of the note, she was under no obligation for
any sum of money to the Plaintiff (Tr. 36). Plaintiff's
Exhibit 7 was then presented to the Defendant Beth
Edwards, which was a letter dated October 5, 1960, from
Mrs. Edwards to Mrs. Bolger, indicating a check in the
an10unt of $25.00 was enclosed, and that Mrs. Edwards
intended to pay off the balance as quickly as possible.
Mrs. Edwards at this time admitted an obligation
but attempted to explain that said obligation was for a
sales party she had put on for Mrs. Bolger (Tr. 36 and
37). The Defendant Beth Edwards then testified that this
obligation was completely paid within a week or ten days
from 'that time (Tr. 39). Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 was then
introduced, which was admitted to be a letter from Mrs.
Edwards to Mrs. Bolger postmarked February 24, 1961
which indicated Mrs. Edwards wanted to know the balance owing to Mrs. Bolger. No satisfactory explanation
was given as to the purpose of such a letter inasmuch
as Mrs. Edwards claimed to owe nothing at this time.
Mr. and Mrs. Edwards testified that Mr. and Mrs.
Bolger and their son came to the said Defendant's home
at a time they were unable to recall definitely, and picked
up all the merchandise listed on Defendant's Exhibits 5
and 6. They further testified that each item 1vas boxed
and as it was removed from the basement of the De-
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fondant's home, it was typed on a list by Mrs. Bolger
(rl'r. 32, 53, 54), and that the merchandise was placed in
tlw automobile of the Plaintiff, and said return of merchandise satisfied any obligation which was outstanding.
rrhe Plaintiff and the husband of the Plaintiff testified that they did receive certain merchandise but only
that valued as set forth in the amended complaint herein, and that nothing further was removed from the home
of the Defendants.

STATEMENT OF POINrrs
POINT ONE
THE FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1 WAS
INTENDE'D ONLY TO EVIDENCE DELIVERY OF MERCHANDISE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND
IS CONTRARY TO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND OVERWHELMING WEIGHT THEREOF.

Appellant is cognizant of the rule that this Court will
not weigh evidence and will sustain a judgment in law
action if the same is supported by competent substantial
evidence. However, the Court has stated in Jensen vs.
Howell, 75 Utah 64, 282 P.2d 1037:
"In this jurisdiction the binding effect of
findings of a trial court in law cases is different
from that in equity cases. In the former the
findings as a general rule are approved if there
is sufficient competent evidence to support them
and ordinarily are not disturbed unless it is manifest that they are so clearly against the weight
of evidence as to indicate a misconception or not
a due consideration of it."
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The Court further stated in the case of Seybold v.
Union Pacific Railroad Comparny, 121 Utah 61, 239 P.2d
174, in reversing the findings of the jury :
"If there is any substantial competent evidence upon which a jury, acting fairly and reasonably, could make the finding, it should stand,
but if the finding is no plainly unreasonable as to
convince the court that no jury, acting fairly and
reasonably, could make such a finding, it cannot
be said to be supported by substantial evidence."

There is no testimony supporting the finding that
the Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is merely evidence of delivery
of merchandise and not a promissory note, except the
self-serving statements of the Defendants, and these are
contrary to the written evidence which was introduced.
All of the parties testified that Exhibit 1 was executed
by the Defendants on the 5th day of March, 1960 (Tr.
9, 50, 58). Further, Mrs. Edwards testified that the document was not a complicated one and that she understood
it. It is evident that the document speaks for itself and
it sets forth no factors which would inidicate it was to be
accepted as a delivery receipt, although an attempt was
made to have the Court so interpret.
In the case of Taylor v. Morris, 163 Cal. 717, 127 P.
66, at Page 68, the Court stated:
"But of course the court was not bound to
accept this explanation and it is well recognized
as a matter of law as well as of plain common
sense that an account of a transaction given in
contemporaneous writing when no differences
have arisen is to be prefered to a substantial oral
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explanation at variance with the writing given
after differences have arisen."
ro the :::;rune effect is the decision m the case of
Smith v. Goethe, 159 Cal. 628, 115 P. 223, wherein the
Court stated:
"The uncertain statements of Carmichael
made yearn after the event under examination
should not be permitted to prevail against the
formal written declaration of the partie'S made at
the time of the transaction and as part of it."
Appellant calls attention to the answer to the amended complaint wherein the Defendant Clyde Edwards' attorney states plainly that Exhibit 1 was not executed by
the Defendant Clyde Edwards, and that it was not until
said Defendant was required to answer under oath that
he admitted that his signature was placed upon Defendant's Exhibit 1.
Accepting the testimony of the Defendants to the
intent of the said Exhibit 11 in the light of all the evidence
to the contrary, is harsh, unfair and inequitable.
Further evidence of an existing obligation was given,
although an attempt was made to explain away said evidence, when Mrs. Edwards was specifically asked whether
she was indebted to the Plaintiff in any fashion after
the date of the promissory note of March 5, 1960. Defendant Mrs. Edwards emphatically denied that she was obligated from the date and thereafter there was nothing
owing by Mrs. Edwards to the Plaintiff (Tr. 36). ~Where-

8
upon, Mrs. Edwards was confronted with Plaintiff's
Exhibit 7, which was a letter bearing date of October 5,
1960, from Mrs. Edwards to the Plaintiff, indicating
that the Defendant Mrs. Edwards was sending a check
for $25.00 and would send more in the future.
Mrs. Edwards attempted to explain the obligation
was for a sales party which she had put on for the Plaintiff, and that within a week or ten days she had paid
everything owing in full (Tr. 39), again emphasizing that
nothing further was owing to the Plaintiff from that
time. Mrs. Edwards then was confronted with Plaintiff's
Exhibit 8 which was a letter postmarked February 24,
1961, from Mrs. Edwards to the Plaintiff, requesting information as to the amount owing from the Defendant
to the Plaintiff. The Defendant Mrs. Edwards was unable to offer any satisfactory explanation for the letter.
All of the documents evidence an obligation owing from
the Defendants to the Plaintiff, and none support the
allegations that the promissory note, Plaintiff's Etlibit
1, was a receipt of delivery. Defendants were credited
$25.00 for cash payment, together with return of merchandise in the amount of $43. 70, pursuant to the pleadings filed herein.
POINT 'TIWO
THE FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS RETURNED
CERTAIN MERCHANDISE, THEREBY SATISFYING ANY
OBLIGATION REPRESENTED BY PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT
I IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND OVERWHELM'
ING WEIGHT THEREOF.
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The finding that the Defendants returned the merchandise in question, thereby satisfying the obligation
represented by Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, relies solely upon
the self-serving statements of the Defendants. It is not
substantiated by any reliable evidence. Mrs. Ida Elliott
testified that she observed some boxes being removed
from the home of the Defendants by the Plaintiff, but did
not know how many were removed (Tr. 58) and was only
present for a few minutes during the transfer (Tr. 59).
Plaintiff had by the pleadings admitted receipt of $43.70
in returned merchandise, and Mrs. Edwards testified
that she had made receipt cards out to Mrs. Bolger, and
that was her general practice (Tr. 42). However, she offered no further evidence of receipt cards for the balance
in question. Mr. Edwards further testified that at the
time Mrs. Bolger was alleged to have picked up the bulk
of the material, she received no written document or any
receipt from Mrs. Bolger, (Tr. 43) even though she had
testified earlier that it was her practice always to make
out receipt cards upon delivery of merchandise. (Tr.
42) The Defendant Mrs. Edwards later testified that as
the merchandise was taken from her basement, the Appellant Mrs. Bolger typed up a list (Tr. 32). Mr. Edwards stated that as merchandise was taken from the
shelves and boxed, Mrs. Bolger typed a list and Mrs. Edwards checked the items as they were taken from the
basement and loaded into the Bolger automobile by .Mr.
Bolger and his son and Mr. Edwards and his son (Tr.
52).
It is not within the realm of possibility that 602
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items could he listed as they were removed from the
Bolger home in March, 19'60, transported to the Edwards
home in Utah County and unloaded in a basement, without concern as to the order in which the merchandise
was placed on shelves, and then several months later be
reboxed and removed from the basement in the exact
order as they were taken from the original storage area of
the Plaintiff Mrs. Bolger. This is precisely what the Defendants ask the Court to believe, as the list of merchandise, Defendant's ffixhibits 5 and 6, is purported to be a
list of the merchandise which was removed from the basement of the Edwards home, and which conforms in exact
sequence to the list set forth in Defendants' Exhibits 2
and 3, which is a list of the merchandise originally taken
from the Plaintiff's premises (Tr. 54).
The Edwards set forth said Exhibits 5 and 6 to be
the receipts by Plaintiff to the Defendants for the merchandise in question. There is no signature or any documentary evidence to establish the fact that said exhibits
werein fact receipts. It is apparent that they are merely
duplicate copies of of the original list which was prepared
by the Plaintiff when the merchandise was sold in March,
1960, by the Plaintiff to the Defendants.
It is further noted that the Defendant Beth Edwards

testified that the invoices which were given to the Plaintiff evidencing a return of certain merchandise contained
certain items that were in the original delivery to the
Defendants (Tr. 1'7 and 31). Yet the list shown in Defendant's Exhibits 5 and 6 shows exactly the same ma-
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terial as listed in the original exhibit listing the merchandise (Defendant's Exhibits 2 and 3) without the removal
of any of the items set forth in said invoices.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' evidence that the promissory note was used
as a receipt for merchandise and their evidence of the
return of all of the merchandise to the Plaintiff is so unrem;onable that it :::;hould be rejected as a matter of law.
A:::; this court said in Continental Bank & Tritst Compcvny vs. R. W. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P. 2d 890,
892:

"While it is true that the testimony of a witness such as Mr. Cheney would ordinarily be regarded as sufficient to compel the affirmance of
the trial court's finding, that is not necessarily
so under all circumstances. Defendant is correct
in arguing that even though the testimony standing alone might be sufficient to support a finding,
it must always be appraised in the light of all the
attendant circumstances and countervailing testimony. If when so viewed, it appears so clearly
and palpably unreasonable that no fact trier, acting fairly and reasonably, could accept it, then it
must be rejected as a matter of law, and the fact
determined otherwise. This is particularly so here
where Mr. Cheney had such a vital personal interest in the controversey, since it obviously would be
greatly to his advantage if he could fix upon Mr.
Stewart the responsibility of paying this large unsecured personal debt."
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Respectfully submitted,

DUANE B. WELLING
Salt Lake City, Utah
1311 Walker Bank Building
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant

